Keywords
social media
hybrid war
state security
fake news
How to Cite
Abstract
Introduction. Informal communication means play a dangerous role in psychological influences conducted as a part of hybrid warfare as it is covert and difficult to identify. This raises the problem of counteracting them. The paper attracts attention to the peculiarities of using informal communications in a context of Russian-Ukrainian information war. Relevance and purpose. The purpose of the study is to summarize the results of research on the role of informal communication as the mean for hybrid war and to analyze their practical application by example. The relevance is due to the need to identify and explore the factors threatening the national information security during the hybrid war. Methodology. The main methods used in the study are critical analysis and synthesis. The additional methods are the terminological analysis; the case study method and the qualitative analysis of interviews with 6 Ukrainian media experts. Results. As a result of the study is established that the purpose of information influence on society includes, first of all, radicalization, a decrease in the level of trust, and, as a consequence, low criticism in the perception of hostile narratives. To achieve this goal, both formal and informal information channels are used. To informal ones rumors on social networks and messengers have been added in modern conditions. A striking example of informal hybrid influence is the provocation of public unrest at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in the town of Novi Sanzhary, Poltava region, on February 20, 2020. One of the main reasons for the situation was the lack of quality official communication. Conclusions. The work has led us to conclude that not only classic media, but also social networks and messengers are becoming more and more a channel for spreading disinformation. There are no regulations and legal restrictions, and information is spread in a real time there. In this case, it is often not untrue, but its presentation shapes the reaction desired by the aggressor, and, hence, leads to the decisions that are beneficial to the manipulators. So, understanding the possible consequences of spreading rumors is often as important as assessing their veracity.
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