No. 3 (49) (2025), Article
No. 3 (49) (2025)

The dynamics of nuclear rhetoric of Kremlin propagandists during Russia's full-scale invasion

Article
https://doi.org/10.21272/Obraz.2025.3(49)-27-37
Published 2025-11-06
Natalia Steblina
SCD (Political Science), professor, Corresponding author Steblina N.
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9799-9786
Vladyslav Boryshchuk
Assistant, Vasyl Stus Donetsk National University, Vinnytsia, Ukraine
https://orcid.org/0009-0002-3032-2820
Natalia Bolkhovska
Senior Lecturer, Vasyl Stus Donetsk National University, Vinnytsia, Ukraine
https://orcid.org/0009-0008-8381-5147
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Keywords

nuclear rhetorics
full-scale Russian invasion
Russian propaganda
Telegram
computer assisted media analysis

How to Cite

Steblina, N., Boryshchuk, V., & Bolkhovska, N. (2025). The dynamics of nuclear rhetoric of Kremlin propagandists during Russia’s full-scale invasion. Obraz, 3 (49), 27-37. https://doi.org/10.21272/Obraz.2025.3(49)-27-37
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Abstract

Introduction. The nuclear rhetoric of the official Kremlin is well-studied, but little attention has been paid to the rhetoric of Russian propagandists, as well as its dynamics. The connections between official rhetoric and the rhetoric of propagandists who pretend to be independent voices from the Kremlin remain unclear.

Relevance and purpose. Studying the topic will allow us to understand what communicative strategies and techniques the enemy uses in its information war, the role of individual propagandists who try to justify a possible nuclear strike, as well as the specifics of Russian propaganda, which is revealed as a result of the analysis of the specified case. The purpose of the study: to establish the presence or absence of a connection between the official Kremlin nuclear rhetoric and the rhetoric of propagandists and, based on the analysis, to identify the features of modern Russian propaganda.

Methodology. For the research Telegram channels of the most popular Russian propagandists (Soloviev, Zakharova, Voenkor Kotyonok) were studied. The RE module (Python language) was used to search for mentions and collocations, and the Spacy library was used to identify the most popular topics.

The results. The study showed that, the rherorics depends on the situation on the front. Attention to this topic was constant throughout all three years, with more mentions in 2022. Propagandists voiced and detailed statements made at the official level in the Kremlin.

Conclusions. It was found that the “nuclear theme” or “nuclear threats” is one of the key themes of modern Russian propaganda. Russian propagandists worked in a coordinated manner: increasing or decreasing attention to the topic, in accordance with the official Kremlin rhetoric. This allows us to conclude that modern Kremlin propaganda corresponds to the ideas about “humanitarian/political technologies” that were widespread in the 80s-90s in the USSR, and then in the early years of the Russian Federation. An important feature of modern Russian propaganda is not only the repetition of Kremlin messages, but also their interpretation, clarification for a wider audience, where each propagandist played his role during the dissemination of “nuclear threats” - to imitate a supposedly independent voice and work in the interests of his audience.

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